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THE UNMAKING OF A BANKRUPTCY COURT:
AFTERMATH OF NOR THERNPIPELINE v. MARATHON
LAWRENCE P. KING*
On June 28, 1982, the Supreme Court in Northern Pipeline Construc-
tion Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., a plurality decision joined in by two
concurring Justices,1 held that 28 U.S.C. § 14712 was unconstitutional
because it authorized bankruptcy courts to adjudicate all matters
related to a case arising under title 11 of the United States Code
(Bankruptcy Code).' The Bankruptcy Code had established bankruptcy
courts as article I legislative courts rather than article III constitutional
courts. The Court stated that such broad jurisdiction can be validly
given only to constitutional courts. Thus ended a decade of study,4
legislative drafting,' and what many authorities had hoped were suc-
cessful attempts to improve the administration of justice in bankruptcy
cases.
6
The Northern Pipeline case routinely began shortly before the
Supreme Court decision was rendered. Marathon Pipe Line Company
had filed a petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in
the District of Minnesota and, in the course of the Chapter 11 case,
brought an action in that bankruptcy court against Northern Pipeline
for damages resulting from an alleged breach of contract. Northern
Pipeline contested the constitutionality of section 1471, which granted
the bankruptcy court jurisdiction to resolve the related contract dispute.
Northern Pipeline lost in the bankruptcy court but won on appeal to the
* Charles Seligson Professor of Law, New York University School of Law; of counsel,
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, N.Y.C.; Co-Reporter, Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy
Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States.
See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982).
2 Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 1471, 92 Stat. 2549, 2668-69 (1978).
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 codified the substantive law of bankruptcy at
11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (Supp. IV 1980). Hereinafter all citations to the Bankruptcy Code
are references to title 11 of the United States Code unless otherwise indicated.
In 1970, the Commission to Study the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States was
established by congressional enactment to review the bankruptcy laws in light of the changed
social and economic conditions of the country since 1898. See Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468
(1970). The report of the Commission, filed in 1973, is in H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess., Pts. I and H (1973), reprinted in 2 App. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY I-1 (15th ed. 1982).
' Bills that preceded final enactment included H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1973);
H.R. 6, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 7330, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); and H.R. 8200,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977). There were comparable bills introduced during this period in the
Senate as well.
' See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-5 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963-67.
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United States district court.7 On direct appeal, the United States
Supreme Court affirmed the district court's holding that section 1471
was unconstitutional
In 1970, the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States began a study of bankruptcy law, practice, and administration
with a view toward making all aspects of the system more relevant to
the changed social and economic conditions in the country.' In the en-
suing years Congress, through its subcommittees, held many hearings
with respect to the proposed reform of the bankruptcy law. Several days
of hearings were devoted to the issue of the type of court that the
system required and the extent of jurisdiction that was necessary in
order for that court to perform properly.0 It was recognized relatively
early that the bankruptcy court should have broad and pervasive
jurisdiction to resolve any and all disputes related to a bankruptcy case
pending before it. While the court need not be required to resolve such
disputes, it was essential that the court have the option to do so. Prior to
the Bankruptcy Code, a dichotomy in the bankruptcy law between "sum-
mary" and "plenary" jurisdiction" made for an extremely inefficient pro-
cedure. Generally speaking, instead of the bankruptcy court resolving
matters involving the bankrupt estate and adverse parties rather quickly
and expeditiously on the merits, the first round of judicial determina-
tions, commencing in the bankruptcy court and flowing up to the ap-
pellate courts of all levels, centered on whether or not the bankruptcy
court had jurisdiction to resolve the dispute. Only after much wasted
time, money, and effort with respect to the jurisdictional question was it
then possible to concentrate on the merits of the dispute.
In the House of Representatives an early draft of a bankruptcy bill
provided not only for the bankruptcy courts to have pervasive jurisdic-
tion but it also provided that the courts should be article III courts. 2
See Marathon Pipe Line Co. v. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co., 5 COLLIER BANKR.
CAS. 2D 114 (D. Minn. 1981).
See 102 S. Ct. at 2880.
See -supra note 4.
10 See Statement of the National Bankruptcy Conference, 1982: Hearings on H.R. 6109
Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1982); H.R. REP. No. 807, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 10 (1982).
" The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, did not explicitly distinguish be-
tween summary and plenary jurisdiction. The developing case law, however, concluded
essentially that summary jurisdiction existed in the bankruptcy court over matters involv-
ing the estate and third persons if the bankruptcy court had possession of the res involved
in the dispute or if the third party consented, expressly or impliedly, to the exercise by the
bankruptcy court of summary jurisdiction. Absent these factors, the estate, represented by
the trustee in bankruptcy, had to bring suit against the third party in what would otherwise
have been the proper forum, either state court or federal court, if an independent basis of
federal jurisdiction existed. See generally 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 3.01[1] (15th ed.
1982).
12 See H.R. 6, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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Soon after this bill was published controversy developed. But before con-
sidering the reasons for the controversy, it is worth noting why in that
particular draft it was decided to go forward with the article III status
for bankruptcy judges.*
As mentioned above, a consensus developed early in the legislative
process that the bankruptcy court should have broad jurisdiction to
determine all matters related to a bankruptcy case. The House subcom-
mittee that considered the bankruptcy legislation made a determined ef-
fort to learn whether such jurisdiction could validly be given to an arti-
cle Ill court. As part of its investigation, the subcommittee sought the
considered judgment of experts in constitutional law and incorporated
their advice in the House Committee Report.13 Although the responses of
the experts were inconclusive, efficiency considerations mandated that
the bankruptcy court should be an article III constitutional court. Conse-
quently, the House Judiciary Committee proposed such status for the
bankruptcy judges in its draft bill.
The House Judiciary Committee's bill quickly stimulated controversy.
Many members of the federal judiciary, particularly members of the
district court bench, feared that the addition of a number of bankruptcy
judges as article III judges would have the untoward effect of diluting
the prestige of the existing district court judges. Thus, the opposition to
the bill was led by the Judicial Conference of the United States, which is
chaired by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and had the support
of the American College of Trial Lawyers. 4 At one stage in the legisla-
tive process a House bill, H.R. 8200, cleared the Judiciary Committee
and came to the floor of the House. At that time an amendment was in-
troduced and passed which changed the status of the bankruptcy judges
from article III to article I judges.15 The passage of the amendment,
however, was only by the Committee of the Whole and not by the House
itself. Final consideration of the amendment by the House was put off to
a later date. Subsequently, new hearings were held both before the
Senate subcommittee and before the House subcommittee relating ex-
clusively to the issue of bankruptcy court status. 6 When the bill again
reached the floor of the House, the amendment was defeated and the bill
"2 See Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitu-
tional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 2682-2706
(1975-76), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1977).
" See Rifkind, Bankruptcy Court-Specialized Court Opposed, 52 Ai. BANKR. L.J.
187 (1978); King, Bankruptcy Code-Specialized Court Supported, 52 AM. BANKR. L.J. 193
(1978).
" The Danielson-Railsback Amendment, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), was introduced
on the floor of the House when the House began consideration of H.R. 8200 on October 27,
1977. The amendment was adopted by a vote of 183-158. See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
1.03[3][d] (15th ed. 1982).
" Hearings were held in December, 1977, before subcommittees of the House and
Senate Judiciary Committees. See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1.03[3][d] (15th ed. 1982).
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was passed containing both broad jurisdiction and article III status for
bankruptcy judges. 7
Meanwhile, the Senate's version of the Bankruptcy Code, S. 2266,
was wending its way through the Senate. The Senate bill, unlike the
House bill, granted the bankruptcy court article I rather than article III
status. In the last minutes of the 95th session of Congress, a compromise
was reached on various differences between S. 2266 and H.R. 8200.8 The
final bill, as passed by the House and Senate, granted the bankruptcy
court broad jurisdiction but established the court as an article I court.
The fight was not over, however, even after the bill was passed. The
Chief Justice launched a major lobbying effort to have the President
veto the bill. To say that the effort was unsuccessful would be a mis-
statement. It was unsuccessful only in the end result. The opposition
was sufficiently important that the President did not sign the bill until
only hours before a pocket veto would have taken effect. 9 It was a close
call.
The bill was signed on November 6, 1978, and by its terms became
effective to cases commenced on and after October 1,1979. o It was shortly
after that date that Marathon filed its Chapter 11 petition and brought
its cause of action in the bankruptcy court against Northern Pipeline.
After October 1, 1979, the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court was
not the only matter that generated controversy. Coincidentally with the
Bankruptcy Code's effective date, a considerably larger number of case
filings began. While this was principally due to the downward turn in
the economy and the upward turn in interest rates and unemployment,
the consumer credit industry was quick to allege that the Bankruptcy
Code made it easier to file for bankruptcy. The National Consumer
Finance Association, which is a coalition of different businesses involved
in the extension of consumer credit, had legislation introduced, par-
ticularly in the Senate, that would change considerably all of the provis-
ions in the Bankruptcy Code affecting consumer debtors." The essence
of the changes proposed by the Association would be to limit or take
away entirely the advantages or benefits which the Bankruptcy Code
has granted consumer debtors and reinstitute the possibility of creditor
abuse that the Bankruptcy Code had attempted to eliminate.
Principal among the changes recommended by the consumer finance
industry is a provision to require consumer debtors to file petitions
under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides for repay-
ment of debt under a plan out of future income, rather than under
See id. 1.03[31[e].
" See id. 1.03[5].
'" See Wall St. J., Oct. 9, 1978, at 7; N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1978, at 39; N.Y. Times,
Editorial, Dec. 1, 1978, at A26.
See Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 402(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682 (1978).
See S. 2000, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
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Chapter 7, which provides for liquidation of the debtor's estate. Essen-
tially, such a provision would make Chapter 13 relief mandatory rather
than optional with the debtor. This provision would change the basic
concept of the bankruptcy laws which has been in existence for many
years. As a matter of fact the idea for mandatory Chapter 13 had been
presented to Congress in 1964, and while it was approved by the
American Bar Association, it was never even reported out by the House
subcommittee.' In the 97th session of Congress, however, it was felt
that the climate was right for another attempt at mandatory Chapter 13.
Senate and House subcommittees held hearings and received testimony
on both sides of the issue.' The credit industry presented testimony
favoring the bill and introduced studies which concluded that many peo-
ple who filed for bankruptcy were able to pay most if not all of their
debts over a five-year period.24
The study that was most often mentioned in the congressional hear-
ings was conducted at Purdue University. The study found that approx-
imately forty percent of debtors who filed bankruptcy petitions could
have proceeded under Chapter 13 and paid at least fifty percent of the
debt over a five-year period.' Contrary testimony presented at the hear-
ings attacked the Purdue study on the grounds that the data did not sup-
port the conclusions drawn and that the group conducting the study may
have been biased because of prior involvement with the credit
industry."
In addition to making Chapter 13 mandatory for consumer debtors,
the credit industry has sought also to limit or delete certain prodebtor
provisions in the Bankruptcy Code. The bill introduced at the behest of
' See H.R. 12784 introduced in the 88th Congress, H.R. 292 and S. 613 introduced in
the 89th Congress, and H.R. 1057 and H.R. 5771 in the 90th Congress. Hearings were held
before a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee on May 24 and 25, 1967, but these
proposals were not approved by that subcommittee.
n See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1981); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and
Commercial Law of the House Comm. of the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1982).
4 See id.
2 See S. REP. No. 446, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1982).
' See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the
House Comm. of the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (statement of Vern Countryman).
It is interesting to note that Professor Robert W. Johnson directed the Purdue University
bankruptcy study. In 1976 Senator Proxmire awarded his "Golden Fleece of the Month"
award for July to the National Science Foundation program that had awarded an earlier
contract to Professor Johnson and his research center to make a study of consumer legisla-
tion. Senator Proxmire found that the Purdue researchers had an overwhelming bias in
favor of the consumer credit industry. He went on to say "this is like asking the Air Force
to study the need for the B.1 bomber or the oil and gas industry to evaluate the depletion
allowance." Press release from the office of Senator William Proxmire, Friday, July 30,
1976. This is the same outfit that made the study for the consumer credit industry on which
the industry now relies so heavily to change a basic concept of the United States bankruptcy
laws.
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the consumer credit industry would affect the provisions in the Bank-
ruptcy Code related to the nondischargeable debts of a debtor, the reaf-
firmation of discharged debts, the ability to redeem property from a lien,
and the exemptions that are set forth in the Bankruptcy Code. In each
one of these categories there was reason, both in policy and in legal
thought, for the changes made by the Bankruptcy Code as compared
with the former Act.
For example, section 522, which concerns exemptions, provides that
a debtor has the option of using the law of exemptions as it exists in the
state of domicile or the list of federal exemptions set forth in section
522(d). Under the former Bankruptcy Act, only the state law of exemp-
tions was applicable.Y The purpose of section 522 was to replace, for
federal bankruptcy purposes, the state law of exemptions with a uniform
federal law. The thought was to have a single and equitable provision
that defined exempt property for debtors and creditors throughout the
entire country.' The uniform law idea, however, did not receive uni-
versal acceptance and it became clear rather early that such a law would
be defeated for political reasons in Congress. The first compromise be-
tween the two extremes that was reached in drafts of the bankruptcy
bills allowed the debtor to choose between the appropriate state law and
a new federal law.' The final compromise between the Senate and the
House versions of the bills additionally gave authority to the states to
limit their domiciliaries from using the federal law of exemptions.' It did
I Section 6 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 6, 30 Stat. 544, 548, provided:
This Act shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts of the exemptions which are
prescribed by the ... State laws in force at the time of the filing of the petition in
the State wherein they have had their domicile for the six months immediately
preceding the filing of the petition, or for a longer portion of such six months than
in any other State ....
" See REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 182 (1973):
The Commission recommends that kinds of property that traditionally have been
treated as exempt by state governments form the nucleus of the federal .exemp-
tions with appropriate federal maximums. This approach avoids the unfairness of
existing state exemption laws, most of which are archaic, some of which are unduly
generous, and some of which are exceedingly niggardly, particularly as to urban
residents.
" See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 126-27, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6087-88:
Though exemption laws have been considered within the province of State law
under the current Bankruptcy Act, H.R. 8200 adopts the position that there is a
Federal interest in seeing that a debtor that goes through bankruptcy comes out
with adequate possessions to begin his fresh start. Recognizing, however, the cir-
cumstances do vary in different parts of the country, the bill permits the States to
set exemption levels appropriate to the locale, and allows debtors to choose be-
tween the State exemptions and the Federal exemptions provided in the bill.
Thus, the bill continues to recognize the States' interest in regulating credit
within the States, but enunciates a bankruptcy policy favoring a fresh start.
' Section 522(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that "an individual debtor may ex-
[Vol. 40:99
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not take long after the effective date of the Bankruptcy Code for states
to enact legislation prohibiting their domiciliaries from using the federal
exemptions of section 522(d). To date more than three-quarters of the
states have.enacted such legislation." Obviously, the movement to enact
this legislation was commenced by the consumer credit industry which
preferred in many states to have the more restrictive state exemptions
available to the debtor rather than the more beneficent federal exemp-
tions.
The credit industry has sought also to modify the debtor's right of
redemption, which is included in the Bankruptcy Code for the first time
and is applicable only in a Chapter 7 liquidation case. Pursuant to section
722, an individual debtor may redeem tangible, personal, consumer prop-
erty from a lien securing a dischargeable consumer debt.2 The right of
redemption exists if the property is exempted pursuant to section 522 or
has been abandoned by the trustee under section 554. Section 722
specifies that the debtor exercises the redemption right by paying the
secured creditor the amount of the allowed secured claim. In essence
this means that the secured creditor will receive payment equal to its ex-
pectations but at the same time the debtor will be able to retain the prop-
erty involved without having to purchase substitute property at a much
higher price. Under section 722, the value of the secured claim equals
the value of the collateral at the time of bankruptcy and it is this amount
that the debtor must pay the secured creditor. The balance, if any, still
owing to the secured creditor is considered an unsecured deficiency that
is subject to the discharge.
A question that has arisen in the cases is whether the debtor may
pay the secured creditor the value of the collateral in installments or
whether the debtor must make a single lump-sum payment. It seems
clear from the Bankruptcy Code, particularly when one considers section
524 in conjunction with section 722, and also considers the thrust of
Chapter 13, that section 722 presupposes the debtor will make a lump-
sum payment absent agreement to the contrary with the secured
creditor. Most cases have so concluded but one or two have permitted a
debtor, over the creditor's objection, to make installment payments.
empt from property of the estate either property that is specified under subsection (d) of
this section [i.e., the federal exemptions], unless the State law that is applicable to the debtor
under paragraph (2)(A) of this subsection specifically does not so authorize, or, in the alter-
native .... "
"' See 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 (15th ed. 1982).
" For the purpose and policy behind the adoption of § 722, which is new to the
bankruptcy law, see REPORT OF THE COMM'N 6N THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 184-85 (1973), reprinted in 2 App. COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY 173-74 (15th ed. 1982).
1 See Arizona Bank v. Carroll, 4 COLLIER BANKIL CAS. 2D 1042 (9th Cir. 1981) (lump
sum payment required); First Bank & Trust Co. of Ithaca, 4 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2D 648
(N.D.N.Y. 1981) (lump sum payment required); In re Carroll, 3 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2D 627
(D. Ariz. 1981) (installment payments permitted).
19831
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The essence of the consumer finance industry's objection to section
722 is that the courts have been using a realistic value when determining
how much the debtor must pay to the secured creditor. In effect, the
courts have been assessing a value comparable to what the secured
creditor would receive for the property if permitted to foreclose on its
lien and sell. This value, of course, equals the secured creditor's real ex-
pectation when it took a security interest in the collateral in the first
place. Nevertheless, the consumer finance industry would have section
722 amended so that the secured creditor received a higher value.' The
industry would also amend section 722 to permit a debtor to extend
payments over a five-year period. This amendment would in effect make
section 722 similar to Chapter 13, which, of course, provides for
payments under a plan out of future income. This result would negate
the original purpose of section 722; under the original logic of the
Bankruptcy Code if a debtor wishes to make installment payments then
it may use Chapter 13 instead of Chapter 7. Additionally, permitting or
requiring a debtor to extend payments over a five-year period would
again tie up a debtor's future income and would subvert the basic fresh
start concept of the liquidation provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
In addition to changing dramatically provisions in Chapter 7, the
credit industry's amendments would change significantly provisions in
Chapter 13 as well. One provision the industry would change is section
1301, which is new to the Bankruptcy Code and provides an automatic
stay of action against codebtors. Under section 1301, when a Chapter 13
petition is filed, a creditor may not then sue an uncompensated guarantor
of a consumer debt. In essence, the section prevents collection efforts at
that time against members of the family, friends, and coworkers of the
debtor. The effect of the stay is to prevent creditors from harassing a
Chapter 13 debtor and to prevent undue pressure from persons in a
close relationship with the debtor. The stay is not perpetual and it does
not prevent eventual collection from or liability of the codebtor. The
stay merely gives the Chapter 13 debtor a little breathing time.
Section 1301 also provides that when the debtor proposes a plan the
court shall lift the stay on request of the creditor with respect to any
part of its claim that the plan will not pay. Once the debtor files a plan
the creditor may seek relief from the stay and section 1301 directs the
court to grant relief to the extent that the plan does not propose to pay
the claim. Thus, if the plan proposes to pay fifty percent of all unsecured
debts, the creditor may obtain relief from the stay to recover the
balance of fifty percent from the codebtor. Even if the plan proposes to
pay 100 cents on the dollar, the creditor may still obtain relief from the
stay to seek interest accruing after the filing of the petition from the
codebtor.
See S. 2000, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1981) (amending § 506(a) to provide that value
for § 722 purposes is presumed to be established resale market price).
[Vol. 40:99
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The consumer finance industry would place the burden of going for-
ward with any procedural steps on the debtor or on the codebtor instead
of on the creditor. Thus, the proposal would automatically permit the
creditor to seek recovery from the codebtor when the debtor files the
plan simply by notifying both the debtor and codebtor that such re-
covery is being sought. If the debtor or codebtor desires to have the stay
continued, they must commence a proceeding in the bankruptcy court to
obtain that kind of relief2 The proposal not only would change the
burden of going forward with the necessary procedural steps, but would
also provide a possible area of abuse. Thus, a creditor could seek
recovery of the debt to an extent not permitted in the hope that the debtor
or codebtor would refrain from filing any proceeding in the bankruptcy
court for an extension of the stay or to obtain a determination of actual
liability.
Another area of major concern with respect to Chapter 13 is the
broad discharge that section 1328 presently permits. As distinguished
from the prior bankruptcy law, on completion of payments under a plan,
the debtor will obtain a discharge of almost all debts. In other words,
section 1328 does not incorporate and does not make applicable to
Chapter 13 cases section 523, which lists the various types of non-
dischargeable debts on which a discharged individual remains liable. The
only nondischargeable debts in a Chapter 13 case are alimony and depend-
ent support, as set forth in section 523(a)(5), and taxes entitled to priority,
as set forth in section 1322. The amendment proposed by the consumer
finance industry, however, would make all of section 523(a) applicable in
Chapter 13 cases and it would not be possible on completion of a plan for
a debtor to obtain any relief from nondischargeable debts."
S. 2000 was introduced in the Senate containing all of the above pro-
posed amendments to the Bankruptcy Code and more. 7 A comparable
bill was introduced in the House of Representatives. The day after the
Supreme Court announced the Northern Pipeline decision, the New
York Times quoted the Vice President and General Counsel of the Na-
tional Consumer Finance Association as saying with respect to the
Supreme Court decision, "it is manna from heaven." 9 What was meant
by such a remark? Up until this time there was a strong likelihood that
first the Senate Judiciary Committee and then the entire Senate would
pass S. 2000 rather easily and quickly. On the other hand, the House was
not acting as quickly on a comparable bill even though the bill had more
' See S. 2000, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 15 (1981) (amending § 1301 of the Bankruptcy
Code). Section 17 of S. 2000 would also make this type of debt separately classifiable thus
permitting the consumer finance creditor to be paid in full while other unsecured creditors
whistle.
See S. 2000, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 19 (1981).
See S. 2000, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
See H.R. 4786, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
N.Y. Times, June 29, 1982, at D6.
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than two hundred cosponsors." The reason for the delay in the House
was that the Judiciary subcommittee was more aware of the dangers in-
herent in the amendments and the overall effect they would have on
basic concepts contained not only in the Bankruptcy Code but which had
been in the system under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Hearings were
scheduled before the House subcommittee which was interested in
receiving testimony from opponents of the amendments proposed by the
consumer finance industry.
The characterization of the Supreme Court's Northern Pipeline decis-
ion as "manna from heaven" implied a recognition by the consumer
finance industry that Congress would now have to enact legislation
quickly to resolve the court problem. The credit industry felt that an
ideal opportunity existed to attach to any such legislation the pro-
creditor amendments discussed above. In effect, Congress' attempt to
cure the problems inherent in the Supreme Court decision would pro-
vide the credit industry the opportunity to enact private interest legisla-
tion.
Even prior to the Northern Pipeline decision, Congressman Rodino,
Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee and Chairman of the Sub-
committee on Monopolies and Commercial Law, introduced H.R. 6109.1
This bill established the bankruptcy courts as article III constitutional
courts. Shortly after the announcement of the Supreme Court decision,
both the House and Senate subcommittees announced dates for public
hearings on the court issue. Both hearings were held in mid-July to
determine how best to cure the problem.42
On the House side, most members of the subcommittee, including
the chairman, were fully cognizant of the existence of a real problem
that required a realistic solution. The Congressmen not only listened to
the testimony of persons representing the academic, judicial, and prac-
ticing bar communities, but, through probing questions, understood the
far-reaching effect of the various opinions issued by the Supreme Court
in the Northern Pipeline case. The subcommittee members searched for
all alternatives to resolve the problem. It was clear from the beginning,
however, that multiple alternatives were nonexistent. The only possible
solution consistent with the various opinions in Northern Pipeline was
to create article III courts to handle bankruptcy matters.
Aside from the merits of the issue, it was also made clear during the
subcommittee hearings that the corrective legislation must be a "clean"
40 See H.R. 4786, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). This does not mean the cosponsors ap-
proved the bill, only that they had been lobbied and agreed to lend their names without any
real consideration of the pros and cons.
41 See H.R. 6109, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
42 See Hearings on H.R. 6109 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial
Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); Hearings on the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1982).
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bill unencumbered by extraneous amendments. Private interest groups
should not be permitted to lobby their amendments as attachments to
the court bill because the effect would simply be to create controversy
and hold up and perhaps Inake impossible eventual passage of a bill deal-
ing with the court system.4"
On the Senate side the testimony from the various groups and indi-
viduals was essentially the same as that on the House side except that
the Senate reaction was quite different. The Chairman of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, Senator Strom Thurmond, indicated in his opening
statement that he had serious reservations about giving bankruptcy
courts article III status." Rather, Senator Thurmond wanted the experts
testifying before the Committee to suggest other alternatives Congress
might adopt to resolve the court problem that would not require
creating article III courts. Witness after witness testified that there
were no alternatives. Each witness testified that because pervasive
jurisdiction to handle all matters relating to bankruptcy was essential to
the effective, efficient, and expeditious operation of the bankruptcy
system, conferring article III status to bankruptcy courts was the only
solution.
One alternative the Committee mentioned was to permit the district
court, which was an article III court, to refer matters to the bankruptcy
judges as special masters and then to review reports or decisions of the
bankruptcy judges de novo. It was pointed out that while it was possible
to legislate such a system it would hardly be the proper thing to do. In
fact, adoption of this alternative would be a backward step of some forty
years rather than a forward-looking type of legislation. Previously, the
bankruptcy judicial system was composed of the district judges and
referees in bankruptcy. The district judges were able to review decis-
ions of the referees de novo." In the course of time, the process of review
by the district court became more limited. Under the 1973 rules, for in-
stance, the order of the bankruptcy judge was final unless a timely ap-
peal was taken;"6 the rule for the standard of appeal or review by the
district judge was the "clearly erroneous" rule."
In August, 1982, Congressman Rodino and others introduced H.R.
" See Hearings on H.R. 6109 Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial
Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 74, 98 (1982).
4 See Hearings on the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1982).
, See 2A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 39.28 (14th ed. 1974).
" FED. R. BANKR. P. 810 provided:
Upon an appeal the district court may affirm, modify, or reverse a referee's
judgment or order, or remand with instructions for further proceedings. The
court shall accept the referee's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous,
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697848 to replace H.R. 6109. The new bill provided for the appointment of
bankruptcy judges under article III of the Constitution and contained a
great deal more detail with respect to court structure and jurisdiction
than did its predecessor, H.R. 6109. In addition, the bill provided for a
transition period during which existing bankruptcy judges would remain
in office until new judges were appointed by the President and confirmed
by the Senate. Congressman Rodino's bill was a "clean" bill, containing
only provisions related to the bankruptcy court and bankruptcy judges.
Since the Octbber 4th deadline was quickly approaching, both the sub-
committee and the entire Judiciary Committee promptly passed H.R.
6978."9 Originally the bill contained a provision that permitted the
reassignment of bankruptcy judges to the district court to hear civil and
criminal cases as the need arose. This so-called "fungibility" concept stir-
red some protest and Congressman Rodino agreed to the deletion of this
provision. Congressman Rodino and others hoped that at some point in
September, 1982, this bill would reach the floor of the House, be passed,
and then sent on to the Senate for action.
In July, 1982, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
issued a memorandum which concluded that the Northern Pipeline deci-
sion did not create any major problem and certainly did not create a
crisis situation.5' The memorandum took the position that in Northern
Pipeline the Supreme Court recognized that the bankruptcy court as it
existed under the 1898 Act could continue to exist until Congress replac-
ed it in 1984 pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code. The memorandum,
however, either overlooked or disregarded two important considera-
tions. First, the Bankruptcy Code repealed the Bankruptcy Act of 1898
and that repealer was effective on October 1, 1979." Secondly, the only
matter with respect to this issue that the Bankruptcy Code retained
from the former Act from October 1, 1979, until April 1, 1984, was the
definition of "bankruptcy court" in former section 2a.' The Ad-
ministrative Office memorandum interpreted this to mean that the
jurisdiction given to that bankruptcy court as set forth in section 2 was
also carried forward. A clear reading of the Bankruptcy Code, however,
shows that even that portion of section 2 and the rest of the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898 was subject to the repealer.'
Subsequent to the issuance of the Administrative Office memoran-
48 See H.R. 6978, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
" See H.R. REP. No. 807, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
Id. at 95.
51 See Memorandum of Administrative Office of the United States Courts dated July
22, 1982 from Mr. Carl Imlay to Mr. William E. Foley, referred to in H.R. REP. No. 807, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 30-49 (1982).
See Pub. L. No. 95-598, §§ 401(a), 402(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682 (1978).
' Id. § 404(a).
" See H.R. REP. No. 807, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 30-49 (1982) (statements in response to
the Memorandum of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts).
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dum, the Judicial Conference of the United States issued its report
together with a proposal for legislation in September, 1982. 5 The
Judicial Conference report takes a tack similar to the Administrative Of-
fice memorandum. The Judicial Conference report is a much longer docu-
ment and contains inaccuracies and conclusions that do not withstand
any analysis. The basic purport of the report is to convince the Congress
not to establish the bankruptcy courts as article III courts but rather to
continue them as article I courts inferior to the United States district
courts. Essentially, the Judicial Conference of the United States is merely
repeating the position it took in 1977 when it vehemently opposed the
creation of article III courts in the bankruptcy system.'
The House subcommittee requested responses to both the memoran-
dum of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts and to the report of
th6 Judicial Conference of the United States. The Committee Report on
H.R. 6978 contains a reference to the Administrative Office memoran-
dum and the responses to it. 7 These responses all concurred in the judg-
ment that the memorandum was wrong. A response was also sent to
Congressman Rodino from Professors Countryman, Kennedy, and King
that pointed out the major areas in which the report of the Judicial Con-
ference of the United States was both factually and logically erroneous.
That response did not discuss all of the errors contained in the report
but concentrated on only the major errors. Nevertheless, the Judicial
Conference of the United States, being a rather prestigious body, does
carry much weight with members of the legislature and thus made it
more difficult for Congress to pass a clean article III bill. The Judicial
Conference legislative proposal, therefore, was introduced as a bill by
Congressman Kastenmeier 8 As a result, in September there were two
bills in the House dealing with the same subject matter but of course in
different ways.
On the Senate side, no bill had yet been introduced. The problem re-
mained that even if the concept of article III status for bankruptcy
courts was agreeable much pressure existed to tack other legislation on
to any bill. All kinds of amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, particularly
dealing with anticonsumer proposals, grain elevator bankruptcies, and
greater protection for shopping center lessors, would be added to any
court bill.
At this time, Congressman Rodino remained adamantly opposed to
anything but a clean bill. In the late days of September just before Con-
See Report of the Judicial Conference of the United States to Congress on Northern
Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. et al. and Proposals for Remedial Con-
gressional Action (1982).
Hearings on S. 2266 and H.R. 8200 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in
Judiciary Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 411 (1977).
See H.R. REP. No. 807, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 30-49 (1982).
See H.R. 7132, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
1983]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
gress' election day recess, which began on October 2nd, an impasse
developed. The Senate would not accede to a clean article III bill. Con-
gressman Rodino would not agree to an article III bill containing amend-
ments to the substantive law. Additionally, the leadership of the House
was concerned with the appropriateness for a Democrat-controlled
House to permit legislation that would enable a Republican President
and Senate to appoint a good number of article III judges.
On October 2nd Congress went into recess. The Solicitor General of
the United States filed an application with the Supreme Court re-
questing that the Court extend the October 4th termination date of the
stay granted in Northern Pipeline. On the first day of the new term of
court, October 4, 1982, the Supreme Court issued an unsigned order ex-
tending the stay of its judgment in Northern Pipeline through December
24, 1982." By this time it was known that Congress would return after
the election for a lame duck session in order to consider the budget and
pass appropriation bills so that the government in general could con-
tinue in operation. Congress returned to Washington for the lame duck
session on November 29, 1982. The House remained in session until
December 22, 1982, and the Senate until December 23. This was, of
course, a short period of time during which it was essential to consider
money bills necessary to keep the government operating, but it was
hoped that Congress would pass legislation dealing with the bankruptcy
court issue as well. A major problem was that bankruptcy matters do
not have a high priority for a Representative or Senator at any given
time. It is not the sort of legislation which affects constituents or from
which votes are gained or lost.
In early October another bill was introduced on the House side by
Congressman M. Caldwell Butler." Congressman Butler was a member
of the House Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law and was
a member of the House Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional
Rights, which drafted the Bankruptcy Code. He was a principal actor
along with Congressman Edwards in the total drafting of the Bankrupt-
cy Code. The bill that Congressman Butler introduced was an omnibus
court bill that would establish the bankruptcy court as an article III
court but in a manner somewhat different from that contained in H.R.
6978. Congressman Butler's bill would create a bankruptcy division of
the United States district court. In effect, this would make the judges
appointed to the bankruptcy division district judges in all respects and
would make them fully assignable to perform the tasks of all district
judges. In addition, the bill contained many amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code principally in the consumer area (similar to S. 2000).
Congressman Butler's bill also proposed to abolish diversity of citizen-
ship as a basis for jurisdiction of the United States district court, and
5' See 103 S. Ct. 199 (1982).
60 See H.R. 7294, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
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contained other amendments affecting the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court of the United States. In total effect, the bill was an omnibus bill
covering many subjects. This was just the sort of bill that was not needed
at this particular moment: The bill not only had little prospect of passage
but also tended to obfuscate the real issues involved.
On November 10, 1982, Senator Dole convened a hearing before the
Subcommittee on Courts of the Senate Judiciary Committee concerning
omnibus bankruptcy and court reform legislation. Testifying at that
hearing, among others, was the Assistant Attorney General of the Office
of Legal Policy of the Department of Justice, who made several observa-
tions." Essentially, the Justice Department endorsed the proposal con-
tained in H.R. 7294, the bill introduced by Congressman Butler, which
was also contained in an unnumbered draft sponsored by Senator Dole.
That position is to support the creation of a bankruptcy division in the
" See Statement of Jonathan C. Rose, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Policy, Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Comm. on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Con-
cerning Omnibus Bankruptcy and Court Reform Legislation 1-10 (Nov. 10, 1982) (copy of
statement on file in Law Review office). Some of Mr. Rose's comments are worth quotation:
I cannot overstate the need for the enactment of remedial legislation before
the Supreme Court's stay expires. The plurality and concurring opinions in the
Northern Pipeline case have left many important questions unanswered, and the
extent to wfiich the bankruptcy courts and the district courts will be able to ad-
judicate bankruptcy matters after December 24 is highly unclear. Some have, in-
deed, questioned whether any court will have jurisdiction over bankruptcy mat-
ters after December 24.
[It is doubtful that the proposal to reestablish an Article I bankruptcy court
advanced by the Judicial Conference would provide a workable bankruptcy
tribunal that would be both effective and capable of withstanding constitutional
scrutiny.
[Tihe Judicial Conference proposal would reduce the efficiency of the
bankruptcy system established in 1978 by bifurcating proceedings between an Arti-
cle I and an Article M tribunal. One of the most important purposes of the 1978
reforms was the consolidation of bankruptcy proceedings before a single forum
with jurisdiction over all relevant matters. This put an end to costly delays and
jurisdictional litigation which had plagued bankruptcy adjudication prior to 1978.
The bifurcated system proposed by the Judicial Conference would resurrect some
of these same problems. Moreover, it would place an additional caseload of uncer-
tain dimensions on already overcrowded district court calendars.
[T]he Department has concluded that only an Article II approach will pro-
vide the workable and constitutional solution that is essential to assure the con-
tinued integrity of the bankruptcy system. Grave constitutional doubts would sur-
round any further temporizing with an Article I solution and would cast a shadow
on all bankruptcy cases raising the possibility of a new ruling that such a
bankruptcy court structure is unconstitutional. In our judgment, a legislative pro-
posal that simply offers an opportunity for more litigation to test its constitutional
validity is no solution at all. The appointment of Article HI judges will resolve any
constitutional concerns, allow the consolidated disposition of all related bankruptcy
matters, and attract the highest calibre of lawyers to the bench.
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United States district court rather than to have a separate bankruptcy
court as is contained in H.R. 6978. Thus, more United States district
judges would be authorized in place of bankruptcy judges. The
troublesome aspect with creating a bankruptcy division is that there
would be too much temptation to assign the district court judges, who
should be handling bankruptcy matters, to other work of the district
court. As was recognized by the Department of Justice, district courts
are generally overburdened with civil and criminal cases; a bankruptcy
division in the district court would create a great deal of pressure to use
the additional judges to be appointed under Senator Dole's and Con-
gressman Butler's bills for general purposes of the district court. The net
effect would be to have bankruptcy matters placed on the back burner
and great delays caused in the administration of bankruptcy cases. The
bankruptcy system itself cannot afford any great delays because of the
general needs not only of creditors but of employees and all others con-
nected with estates in the bankruptcy or reorganization process. But it
is important to note that the Department of Justice fully recognized the
need for a legislative solution to the problems created as a result of the
Supreme Court decision in Northern Pipeline. A nonsolution is a further
attempt at an article I court.2 Additionally, the Department of Justice
clearly maintained that it is so essential to provide a legislative solution
to the court crisis that those with their own private interest legislation
should not be permitted to attach to a court bill any other amendatory
proposals.
During November and December, 1982, there was a good deal of jockey-
ing for position in the Congress, particularly in the Senate. As positions
moved more closely toward agreement in principle on an article III
court, the laundry list of substantive law amendments grew. The anti-
consumer lobby pushed harder for the contents of S. 2000. Senator Dole
maintained his insistence on a grain elevator bankruptcy amendment,
the shopping center people needed their provisions, and the Senate
wanted numerous so-called technical amendments, originally contained
in S. 863," to be included in any subsequent legislation. On the House
side, Congressman Rodino took the position, quite properly, that the only
matter the Supreme Court held had to be taken care of was the court
system. The Court had said nothing about consumer debtors, shopping
centers, or grain elevators. It was irresponsible to change around so
much of the Bankruptcy Code when all that needed immediate attention
was the court.
" It must be remembered throughout that footnote 31 of the plurality opinion in North-
ern Pipeline, 102 S. Ct. at 2876 n.31, has now called into question the validity of the pre-1978
court system. The former jurisdiction vested in the bankruptcy court had never been tested
in the Supreme Court and footnote 31 raises the serious spectre that it was not a constitu-
tional system.
See S. 863, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
[Vol. 40:99
AFTERMATH OF NORTHERN PIPELINE
Two reasons prevented any bill from reaching the floor of either side
of Congress. In the Senate, Senator Metzenbaum had given notice that
any bankruptcy bill or bankruptcy court bill that included the anticon-
sumer mandatory Chapter 13 provision would be subject to his
filibuster. In a lame duck 'session, a filibuster can easily be the death
knell of any bill. Senator Baker, the Republican leader, had indicated
that he would not permit any such bill to come to the floor unless some
accommodation could be made to prevent a filibuster. When it looked
like this could be accomplished by deleting the mandatory Chapter 13
provision, a couple of other Senators threatened a filibuster against any
article III proposal. Accordingly, no bill reached the floor of the Senate
prior to its adjournment on December 23, 1982. On the House side, the
Rodino bill could not go through the Rules Committee and come to the
floor in ordinary course because it would be subject to amendments on
the floor and there were Representatives ready to attach the consumer
credit industry proposals. One alternative was to take the bill up on
suspension calendar, meaning that it would not be subject to any amend-
ments; however, such a procedure requires a two-thirds vote for
passage. One factor of note that was printed in Time magazine prior to
the November elections was that the consumer credit industry political
action committee had contributed over $700,000 to congressional cam-
paigns.' In any event, the House did not act prior to its adjournment on
December 22, 1982.
At the time of adjournment, the Solicitor General filed an applica-
tion with the Supreme Court for a further extension of the stay. On Fri-
day, December 24, 1982, the Supreme Court denied the application." The
prospect of chaos in the bankruptcy court was imminent.
Recognizing the possibility that Congress would not act, and the
Court would not extend the stay, the Judicial Conference of the United
States had, at its September, 1982, meeting, authorized the drafting and
transmission to the circuits of an emergency rule to fill the gap in the
court system. Of course, while it was trying to fill the gap, the Judicial
Conference was also trying to and successfully did maintain the gap by
lobbying strongly against an article III court. The emergency rule took
the position that residual jurisdiction was in the district court.
Therefore, the rule provided, inter alia, for the district court to appoint,
by adopting this rule, the bankruptcy judges in the district as special
masters. After receiving comments on the emergency rule, presumably
of an adverse nature, a revised draft was sent out to the judicial circuits
with the recommendation that the rule be adopted by the district courts.
It was adopted and made effective on December 25, 1982, in many cir-
cuits, and variations of that rule were adopted in other circuits.
See TiME, Oct. 25, 1982, at 24.
The Supreme Court was not in session. A telephonic conference resulted in a 8-0
vote, Justice O'Connor could not be reached. Wash. Post, Dec. 24, 1982, at Al.
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Essentially, the rule provides that all cases under the Bankruptcy
Code and all civil actions arising under or related to such cases are refer-
red to the bankruptcy judges. Orders and judgments by the bankruptcy
judge in "unrelated proceedings" are final unless an appeal is taken to
the district judge within ten days after entry of the order or judgment."
In "related proceedings" the bankruptcy judge submits findings, conclu-
sions, and a proposed judgment or order to the district judge but the
parties may consent to entry of final judgment by the bankruptcy
judge." Finally, in "unrelated proceedings," the bankruptcy judge may
certify the matter to the district judge even if it is not controverted.
The emergency rule has only two flaws: it is invalid (illegal); and, it is
unworkable. The rule is invalid because it tries to do what the Supreme
Court has said Congress may not do. What gives the district court the
authority to provide by rule that the bankruptcy judge may dispose of
any matters? In Northern Pipeline, the Court held that all of the grant of
jurisdiction to the article I court was unconstitutional. 8 It did not say
anything about or distinguish between "related" and "unrelated" pro-
ceedings.
With respect to "related proceedings" the rule in effect appoints the
bankruptcy judge as special master albeit without using the label. The
only authority for district judges to appoint special masters is Rule 53 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court has said that
the authority under Rule 53 is so limited as to be almost nonexistent. 9
Yet under the emergency rule, the district court is proposing to make a
blanket appointment in all Bankruptcy Code cases.
The attempt at delineating what is an "unrelated proceeding" also
must fall. One objection the Court had to the bankruptcy court's jurisdic-
tion was that it extended over suits between private parties or state law
causes of action. Yet, the emergency rule provides that some matters
listed as unrelated remain so even if state law is involved.
Finally, the district court has no authority even to adopt a rule. Pur-
suant to what grant of power does it purport to do so? Not under former
Bankruptcy Rule 927 (which permitted the district court to adopt local
6 See infra note 67 (definition of "related proceeding").
67 "A related proceeding" is defined in the emergency rule as one that could have been
brought in a federal or state court in the absence of the bankruptcy case. The rule then goes
on to list a host of such actions involving a determination of state law that it deems to be
"unrelated proceedings."
102 S. Ct. at 2879-80.
" FED. R. Civ. P. 53 provides, in part, as follows:
(b) A reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule .... [I]n ac-
tions to be tried without a jury, save in matters of account and of difficult com-
putation of damages, a reference shall be made only upon a showing that some ex-
ceptional condition requires it.
See LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 256, 259 (1957) ("The use of masters is
'to aid judges in the performance of specific judicial duties, as they may arise in the pro-
gress of a cause,' ... and not to displace the court").
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bankruptcy rules). 7 It would certainly appear that the former rule would
be in conflict with the Bankruptcy Code and, therefore, would be inap-
plicable pursuant to section 405(d) of that Act.71 Moreover, there is no
jurisdiction in the district court. The Supreme Court held that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1471(c) was unconstitutional. The way that section was structured,
subsection (a) gave the district court jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases;
subsection (b) gave the district court pervasive jurisdiction over all civil
actions related to or arising under bankruptcy cases; but subsection (c)
stated that such Jurisdiction in subsections (a) and (b) was to be exercised
by the bankruptcy court. Or, conversely, the district court could not ex-
ercise the jurisdiction granted by subsections (a) and (b). This is what
Congress has said. The Supreme Court then said that the bankruptcy
court could not exercise the jurisdiction because it was an article I court.
But the Supreme Court did not say and could not say that, therefore, the
jurisdiction may be exercised by the district court. Congress has said to
the contrary. By what stretch of the legal imagination can a local rule of
court override a congressional mandate and a Supreme Court holding?
Assuming that the rule will be upheld (after all, it will be considered
by the very judges making up the Judicial Conference that ordered its
drafting and promulgation), it nevertheless is unworkable and will not
help the judicial system. In essence, a double hearing is required either
because the matter is a "related proceeding" or because the bankruptcy
judge will certify most other proceedings. The inefficiency, cost, and
delay attendant upon two trials is inestimable. Such a proposal is also
thoroughly irresponsible and evidences a complete lack of both
understanding of an extremely important part of the federal judicial
system and sympathy for it and those involved in it.
Additionally, because the very authority of the bankruptcy judge is
called into question, it should prove difficult if not impossible to convince
lenders to finance Chapter 11 debtors and third parties to purchase
assets from the estate. If, for example, a lender will not provide financ-
ing, a plant or division of a business undergoing reorganization will be
forced to close. Such closing will cause the layoff of many employees in
that community. And a lender will not be willing to extend such financ-
ing if it cannot be secure that the court order authorizing the loan will
withstand attack at some later date. The emergency rule says the
bankruptcy court may issue such an order. But the rule offers little
'o See FED. R. BANKR. P. 927.
Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 405(d), 92 Stat. 2549, 2685 (1978), provides that:
The rules prescribed under section 2075 of title 28 of the United States Code
and in effect on September 30, 1979, shall apply to cases under title 11, to the ex-
tent not inconsistent with the amendments made by this Act, or with this Act, un-
til such rules are repealed or superseded ....
The reasons why the emergency rule is legally invalid and also unworkable are
specified in detail in a statement of the National Bankruptcy Conference printed in 128
CONG. REC. H9640-43 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1982).
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solace when one is contemplating advancing hundreds of thousands of
dollars or perhaps millions. The same problem exists with respect to pro-
spective purchasers. If they cannot rely on an unimpeachable order
authorizing the sale, why should they buy? If they do not buy, what will
creditors receive from the bankrupt estate? This is the real harm that
may be visited upon debtors and creditors, employees and landlords,
suppliers and governmental agencies, and all those who ordinarily do
business or are connected with a Chapter 11 debtor, including, by the
way, shareholders.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court has created a mess. That was not
totally unanticipated. But Congress has thus far acted irresponsibly in
responding and private interest groups have acted out of pure
selfishness to prevent Congress from responding unless they have their
way. It is too bad and a sad commentary on our leaders in Washington.
The 98th Congress came into session on January 3, 1983. It stayed for a
few days and then recessed toward the end of that week not to
reconvene again until the week of January 24th. Then some time is
necessary for it to organize itself. In view of its past performance one
may wonder why it bothers to do so. In any event, it is quite conceivable
that no legislation will be forthcoming until June, 1983, if then. What will
happen to the bankruptcy system and those who need the relief offered
by it remains to be seen. As dire a prediction as one would care to make
would not be an exaggeration.
Postscript
In the 98th Congress, convening on January 3, 1983, Congressman
Rodino introduced H.R. 3 which would establish the bankruptcy courts
as article III courts. On January 24,1983, Senator Dole conducted hearings
before the Senate's Subcommittee on Courts regarding not only the court
problem, but also the amendments to the Bankruptcy Code proposed by
the consumer credit industry, proposed changes with respect to shop-
ping center lessors, grain elevator bankruptcy, time sharing arrange-
ments and other measures. Of interest at this hearing was the change of
position of the Department of Justice and presumably the Reagan Ad-
ministration as announced by Mr. Jonathan Rose, Assistant Attorney
General of the Office of Legal Policy of the Department of Justice. In his
testimony, Mr. Rose supported a Judicial Conference proposal that had
been sent to Congressman Butler on December 1, 1982.12 Some partici-
pants in the hearings were surprised and disappointed by Mr. Rose's
change of position since the Judicial Conference proposal did not recom-
mend article III status for bankruptcy judges. That proposal would
abolish bankruptcy courts, increase the number of federal district
2 Statement of Jonathan Rose, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Policy,
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Comm. on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Concerning
Bankruptcy Reform (Jan. 24, 1983) (copy of statement on file in Law Review Office).
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judges, and create the office of bankruptcy administrator. The latter
functionary would approve various kinds of applications and the like but
would not resolve contested matters. Parties could, however, take a mat-
ter from the administrator to the district judge by acting within ten
days of the administrator's action. In effect, therefore, if no action were
taken within that time, the administrator's action would become final.
Furthermore, if a matter was taken to the district judge, he could refer
it to a magistrate whose ruling would be final if the parties consented to
it. If not, his proposed findings would go to the district judge.
The Judicial Conference's proposal is as unconstitutional as its
emergency interim rule. Neither the bankruptcy administrator nor the
magistrate is an article III judge, yet they are empowered to enter what
are in effect final orders. The system is also tremendously inefficient be-
cause, with any luck, the litigants can have three trials on the same issue
instead of one. By whatever name the proposal would call it, there would
be a hearing before the administrator, then one before the magistrate,
and finally, a hearing or trial before the district judge.
It may be recalled that the same Jonathan Rose testified on behalf of
the Department of Justice on November 10, 1982, before the same sub-
committee of Senator Dole.73 At that time he stated flatly that article III
status for bankruptcy judges was the only legal and sensible solution to
the problem and that the proposed emergency interim rule of the
Judicial Conference was unconstitutional. Yet here he was on January
24, 1983, asserting that article III status was not necessary, and that the
proposed legislation was, at least inferentially, constitutional. 4
Several decisions have come down with respect to the validity of the
Judicial Conference's emergency interim rule. The most questionable of
the lot is a decision of Judge Robert E. DeMascio, district judge in the
Eastern District of Michigan (Detroit).5 His decision upheld the validity
7 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
Hearings were also held before the House Subcommittee on Monopolies and Com-
mercial Law on February 2, 1983.
I In re Northland Point Partners, No. 82-05387-W (E.D. Mich. Jan. 7, 1983). A contrary
view was taken in Winters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Dayton v. Schear Group, Adv. No.
3082-0491 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 27, 1982), in which the bankruptcy judge ruled that neither the
bankruptcy court nor the district court has jurisdiction. See also In re Jorges Carpet Mills,
Inc., No. 1-80-02516 (E.D. Tenn. 1983) (bankruptcy judge held that neither district courts nor
bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to adjudicate action to avoid a preferential transfer);
Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, Misc. No. 4-221-E (N.D. Tex. Jan. 29, 1983)
(district court held that bankruptcy court and district court had jurisdiction), aff'd, No.
83-1048 (6th Cir. 1983) (circuit court affirmed based on its reading of 28 U.S.C. § 1334).
In two excellently reasoned opinions, the emergency rule was held invalid: Color Craft
Press, Ltd. v. Nationwide Shipper Sys., Inc. (in re Color Craft Press, Ltd.), Bktcy No.
81M-03184 (Bankr. D. Utah 1983); Gillman v. Preston Family Inv. Co. (In re Richardson),
Bktcy No. 82C-00736 (Bankr. D. Utah 1983). These decisions were, however, reversed on ap-
peal to the district court in a single opinion. - COLLIER BANKR. CAs. 2D - (D. Utah
1983).
On the legislative front, events subsequent to those referred to in the text at notes 72-74
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of the rule. The difficulty with the decision, aside from its legal reason-
ing, is one of propriety. Judge DeMascio is also the chairman of the
Bankruptcy Committee of the Judicial Conference, which had a most im-
portant role to play in the formulation of the policy, outline, and perhaps
drafting of the rule itself. Not only is a serious question raised as to
whether he should have heard the proceeding in the first place, but the
appropriateness of his Chief Judge's subsequent action may also be ques-
tioned. Under date of January 7, 1983, John Feikens, Chief Judge
for the Eastern District of Michigan, sent a copy of Judge DeMascio's
decision to all Chief Judges of United States district courts with a cover
letter suggesting that the decision "might be helpful to you in your
District."
have further clouded the prospects of any sensible solution. The Judicial Conference pro-
posal was introduced by Senator Dole as S. 443 but it received no votes in the Senate
Judiciary Committee. Instead, S. 1983, sponsored by Senator Heflin, was approved by that
Committee by a vote of 14 to 1. The essence of the bill is to retain the bankruptcy court as
an article I court, adjunct to the district court. The broad grant of jurisdiction granted the
district court may be exercised by the bankruptcy court, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1471(c)(1) a party who fails to object by motion raised in his first pleading is deemed to con-
sent to the bankruptcy court's exercise of such jurisdiction. Accordingly, what the Supreme
Court said in Northern Pipeline was unconstitutional, Senator Heflin and the full Judiciary
Committee would reenact. They would even permit an unconstitutional jurisdiction to be
granted by consent. The bill also permits the district judge to recall any proceeding on his
own motion or on motion of the bankruptcy judge. In the event of recall, the district judge
may then refer the proceeding to a magistrate or to the bankruptcy judge as a special master.
It is apparent that the Senate Committee is acceding to the lobbying of the Chief Justice
and federal judiciary generally and remains willing to adopt legislation of extremely ques-
tionable constitutional validity and certainly of extremely inefficient practical application.
Another difficulty of the Senate approach is that if the bill passes, it would provide for
the bankruptcy courts to be article I courts. H.R. 3, on the other hand, provides for such
courts to be article III courts. If both bills were passed and went to Conference could there
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